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Introduction  
Concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the threat posed by bioterrorism have assumed 
greater political prominence in recent years.1 In response, governments are actively attempting to frustrate 
the diffusion of technologies, relevant to the production of biological weapons, to regimes and non-state 
actors which might develop and use such weapons. Their most recent efforts have involved the introduction 
of a range of new national measures to control access to materials, knowledge and technologies.  
Preventing the diffusion of the necessary knowledge and technologies used to develop biological weapons is 
complicated because the underlying technologies often have legitimate and socially beneficial applications. 
Any controls to prevent their hostile application can also potentially disrupt legitimate activity, thereby 
generating social costs. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that the introduction of biosecurity 
controls in the US and Germany are adversely affecting scientific research in those countries.2 Governments 
therefore need to balance these costs against the security benefits that such controls generate.   
To do this policy makers need information on the impact of these new ‘biosecurity’ measures. However, this 
is a new area of policy and few impact assessments have been performed. This pilot project, funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council3, developed and validated new methods for assessing the impact 
that UK government biosecurity policies, introduced to prevent legitimate scientific research from being 
misused, are having on the practice of science. This short report briefly explains the project and outlines a 
sample of the initial results. 
What is dual use? 
This project was concerned with ‘dual use’ technologies. Dual use is a term that is applied to the tangible and 
intangible features of a technology that enable it to be applied to both hostile and peaceful ends with no, or 
only minor, modifications.4 Most peaceful applications are civilian in context, but there are also peaceful 
military applications, such as developing and producing vaccines against germ warfare agents. Hostile 
contexts have traditionally been thought of as military and state-based, but increasingly attention has been 
directed towards the possibility that non-state actors, such as terrorists, might use biological weapons.5 The 
dual use nature of some of the relevant technologies and scientific knowledge raises the possibility that 
scientists engaged in legitimate research for peaceful purposes might have their work misused and applied to 
biological warfare purposes. This includes the possibility of inadvertent assistance through seemingly 
harmless activities, such as postgraduate teaching. 
The 'dual use dilemma' faced by the many countries who are determined to take measures to reduce 
opportunities for biological weapons development is that, compared to hostile applications, there is a vast 
range of peaceful purposes. Moreover, these applications are spreading across the world and in many cases 
                                            
1 United Nations Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High 
Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change, December 2004, G8 (2004), Action Plan on Nonproliferation, Sea Island Summit, 
9 June 2004, G8 (2003), Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A G8 Declaration, Evian Summit, 3 June 2003 
2 See for example, “An open letter to Elias Zerhouni” Science, Vol 307, Issue 5714, March 4th 2005; Cohen et al, “The pitfalls of 
bioterrorism preparedness: the anthrax and smallpox experiences”, American Journal of Public Health, vol 10, 2004; Brumfiel G, 
“US universities up in arms over licence plans for foreign staff”, Nature, vol 431, 2004; van Aken et al, “Biosecurity requires 
international supervision”, Nature, vol 431, 2004; May T. “Isolation is not the answer”, Nature, vol 429, 2004.   
3 The ESRC is an independent research council charged with promoting and supporting research into key issues of concern to 
social science. 
4 Molas-Gallart J and JP Robinson (1997), Assessment of Dual-use Technologies in the Context of European Security and 
Defence, Report for the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA), European Parliament. 
5 See for example, Interpol “Final Communiqué”, 1st Interpol Global Conference, Lyon, France, 1-2 March 2005 as downloaded 
from http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/Conferences/FinalCommunique.asp 
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their diffusion should be encouraged rather than slowed down. Governing dual use technologies therefore 
poses a serious policy design dilemma: the regulatory regime needs to balance the suppression of negative 
applications (in order to reduce the risk of germ warfare) without hindering the development of technology for 
positive purposes. 
The governance regime to do this has at its heart the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction (BWC). This convention came into force in 1975 and currently has 153 state parties and 16 
signatory states. The BWC obliges its member states  
never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain:  
Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; 
Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins 
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.6 
When implementing the BWC nationally, the United Kingdom, through the adoption of the Biological 
Weapons Act 1974, placed the obligation on all of its citizens “never in any circumstance to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their 
origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes”.7 The 1974 Act additionally obliges citizens not to transfer, enter into an 
agreement to transfer, or make arrangements under which another person transfers any biological agent or 
toxin “if the biological agent or toxin is likely to be kept or used (whether by the transferee or any other 
person) otherwise than for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes and he knows or has reason to 
believe that this is the case”.8  
As well as implementing the BWC at the national level, governments use a range of other national policies to 
control the proliferation of dual use technologies. Most of these regulatory efforts aim to provide sufficient 
oversight of the possession and transfers of technology so that roadblocks can be put in place in time to stop 
the application of technology for illicit purposes. The most recent pieces of biosecurity legislation entered into 
UK law are the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001 which amended the Biological Weapons Act, 
1974 and placed new legal obligations on the scientific community to ensure their technologies are not 
misused and misappropriated, and the secondary legislation to the Export Control Act, 2002 introduced in 
2004 which regulates the transfer of intangible technologies. 
Project objectives and methods 
The aim of this pilot project was to assist the successful design and implementation of policy by developing 
and validating new methods for gathering qualitative and quantitative data on the impact of biosecurity 
controls on UK science.  
The project gathered data using questionnaires and interviews from a small sample of the UK scientific 
community. The sample was constructed using standard bibliometric methods based on a network of UK 
scientists who published peer-reviewed research between 1989 and 2004 relating to dangerous pathogens, 
                                            
6 Article 1, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1972.  
7 Article 1, The Biological Weapons Act, United Kingdom, 1974.  
8 Article 1A, The Biological Weapons Act, United Kingdom, 1974 (as amended by the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001). 
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as defined in Schedule 5 of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001.9 The original dataset was then 
cleaned up and triangulated with other datasets to provide a core sample of 100 scientists. A control group, 
not engaged in research using Schedule 5 agents, was also selected from the broader scientific community. 
This control allowed the research finding to be placed in a wider context and allowed the research team to 
evaluate how representative the views of our sample were. 
The development, piloting and validation of the questionnaire was undertaken in collaboration with both the 
security and scientific communities over a six month period. This involved an iterative process of finding 
unambiguous terminology and becoming aware of the specific issues facing different communities. Once the 
questionnaire was piloted, it was sent to all 128 members of the sample - scientists, funders of science, 
biosafety officials and security officials.  
Interviews were also conducted with 27 members of the sample to explore at a deeper level the individual 
answers received and to test the general trends emerging.  
The project achieved a 53% response rate (68 usable responses). 
Who participated? 
The scientists in our sample all worked with agents listed in Schedule 5 of the 2001 Anti Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act (71% with the pathogens, 76% with Schedule 5 toxins and 91% with the genetic material 
associated with the action of either the pathogens or toxins).  
The majority of our scientists and biosafety officials were located within universities or other teaching 
institutions (68%), although government laboratories (9%) and commercial R&D (6%) were also represented. 
Institution size was typically between 11 and 100 active researchers, although a number of smaller 
institutions with less than ten active researchers were also represented. The institutions contained the 
necessary equipment and infrastructure to perform work at hazard group 2 (91%) and hazard group 3 (74%), 
as detailed in the 2002 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations.10 Seventy-nine per cent of 
the institutions were able to work with toxins or with genetic material associated with the action of pathogens 
or toxins under conditions of containment.  
Given that the sampling method focused on the core of a network, the respondents were more senior, better 
networked and more experienced than the typical member of the UK scientific community would be. For 
example, 71% of the scientists held positions of overall responsibility for research projects using Schedule 5 
agents, 68% were day-to-day managers of laboratories, and just over half of the scientists (53%) actively 
engaged in research with Schedule 5 agents. Many of the participants indicated having experience as 
biosafety (44%) and/or biosecurity advisors (24%). 
Over half of the total sample, 56%, described themselves as previously involved with biosecurity issues 
including interactions with relevant government officials.  
What did the project find? 
The project produced three basic findings of policy interest:  
                                            
9 The Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act details in Schedule 5 a number of pathogens and toxins which require special security 
measures. These include if requested notification before keeping or using the substances; information about who has access; and 
a requirement to provide, if necessary, physical security details. The list currently contains 19 viruses, 5 rickettsiae, 13 bacteria and 
11 toxins and includes any genetic material associated with the pathogenicity of the micro-organism, and any genetically modified 
organism containing any such sequence. 
10 Schedule 3, Additional Provisions Relating to Work with Biological Agents, Part 1, Provisions of General Application to Biological 
Agents, The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations, United Kingdom, 2002. 
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The first finding is that the implementation of new biosecurity measures in the UK seems not to have had the 
same negative impact as has been reported in the US and Germany. This unexpected finding is important 
because it suggests that biosecurity policy options do not have to involve a trade-off between advances in 
scientific research and security. While clearly it is possible that advances in scientific understanding can 
increase the risks of misuse, and, similarly, that draconian security measures could disrupt science, this 
finding suggests that, at present, this is not necessarily the case. 
The second finding is that the success of this implementation was related to three factors (1) pre-existing 
security and biosafety measures; (2) a responsive approach to regulation by the implementing body; and (3) 
a flexible and socially responsible reaction by this sample of the scientific community. Had any one of these 
conditions not been in place, the costs could have been substantially higher, but together they have 
contributed towards a successful initial implementation. 
The third finding is that while the initial stages of the implementation process built on these success factors, 
future implementation is likely to be more difficult. The implementation of wider security measures will have to 
move beyond ‘piggybacking’ on pre-existing security and biosafety measures and will require a greater 
degree of interaction between the scientific and security communities. 
Specific findings 
This section will briefly run through some of the specific findings of the pilot project as they relate to 
operational procedures, impact of the new requirements and perceptions held by our sample about biological 
warfare issues.  
Channels of communication  
Our sample received most of their information about changes in biosafety or biosecurity regulations through 
channels of communication which have been designed primarily for the distribution of health and safety 
information. Our sample indicated that their main sources of information were targeted distributions from the 
Health and Safety Executive (85%), whilst 59% of the sample performed proactive scanning of health and 
safety websites. However, over half the sample (53%) also received information from targeted distribution by 
governmental departments such as the Department of Trade and Industry. Only 15% actively scanned other 
sources for information, which included those primarily handling biosecurity issues.  
The preference for health and safety channels reflects the long-established, close links between the biosafety 
and scientific communities that have been used to successfully implement a range of regulations on scientific 
practice since the 1970s. This is important because it highlights how the UK scientific community was already 
subject to regulations before the introduction of new biosecurity controls, and that this earlier implementation 
of these biosafety regulations created a link between government and science. 
Procedures in place before 2001 
One of the main factors which has influenced the level of costs associated with introducing new biosecurity 
controls in the UK seems to be the existence of a range of procedures at institutions before the introduction 
of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act in 2001. Many organisations in the sample had pre-existing 
procedures for the purposes of either biosafety obligations or concerns about animal rights terrorism. These 
procedures also functioned as biosecurity controls and helped reduce the costs of implementing the security 
requirements attached to Schedule 5 pathogens and toxins. For example, the majority of our respondents 
reported their institutions as having procedures to monitor the acquisition of dangerous material (71%) and 
disposal of equipment (71%) which pre-dated the obligations found in the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security 
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Act, 2001. Similarly, 71% and 74% of the sample reported that access to laboratories and data by occasional 
visitors and short-term workers was controlled in their institutions prior to 2001. There were similar pre-
existing controls in place in over half the institutions to govern the transfer of dangerous materials on-site 
(56%) and off-site (65%).  
Changes in operational procedures since 2001 
Notwithstanding these existing procedures, our sample indicated that substantial changes have occurred in 
the operational procedures of their institutions since 2001. When asked about those changes, the sample 
reported that more attention is now being given to: biosafety obligations (79%), risk assessments (68%), 
material safety (53%), material transfer (56%), and ethical reviews (47%). Whilst a substantial number of the 
sample (41%) reported their institutions as having had in place procedures to review personnel with current 
access to controlled pathogens prior to 2001, only 26% reported an increase in that activity since the 
introduction of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001.  
When asked what the sample believed had caused these procedural changes, the majority of our sample 
(74%) believed they were the result of the new legal requirements but almost half (41%) believed that other 
pressures, such as the increased activities of animal rights protestors, might have been responsible.  
Benefits: new funding contracts and partners 
Only a small subset of the sample (15%) reported having received any direct benefit from the increased 
attention to biosecurity since 2001. Of those that did record a benefit, it typically took the form of winning new 
contracts or collaborative partners. The small number of participants that had moved into new areas of R&D 
(15%) did so mainly for financial reasons. Only one institution listed as a benefit the increased opportunities 
for discussion with government officials on the validity of these measures. Whilst these numbers seem low, it 
is important to note that 26% of our sample thought that it might be too soon to judge whether they could 
experience any benefits. In the USA, concerns about bioterrorism have opened up new funding sources for 
research, and it is conceivable that our sample may benefit from this in the future. 
Costs: experiences of major complications or setbacks in the last three 
years  
Although some of the sample has experienced benefits, the project also gathered data on a range of costs 
that have been experienced since 2001. Forty one percent of the sample indicated having experienced no 
major complications or setbacks in the last three years. However, our sample did indicate that four research 
projects have had to be abandoned as a direct result of the recent increase in national and international 
attention to the need to prevent science and technology from being diverted into biological warfare or 
bioterrorism purposes. Despite this low number, a large proportion of the sample reported experiencing other 
‘major complications or setbacks’ over the last three years. The issue causing the most complications or 
setbacks was the difficulty in obtaining pathogens and toxins, but other issues have also caused major 
complications such as increased mandatory biosafety requirements (15%), increased mandatory biosecurity 
requirements, and changes to waste disposal requirements (both experienced by 12% of the sample).  
Further investigation of these results found that those who had experienced these ‘major complications and 
setbacks’ believed they were as much a result of changes in US biosecurity controls as changes in UK 
requirements. The influence of US regulations on UK science reaffirms the global nature of science and 
consequently indicates the global impact of any form of biosecurity control.  
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Which policies are worth considering?  
Our sample was presented with a list of current biosecurity policy options and asked which they would 
consider as a means to strengthen the biosecurity norm. The figures presented in Table 1 indicate 
respondents who thought the measures were worth considering, rather than respondents who supported 
such measures. 
Table 1: Views on biosecurity policy options 
CURRENT POLICY OPTIONS TO PROTECT AGAINST MISUSE 
PERCENTAGE WHO 
WOULD CONSIDER THAT 
OPTION 
Increased security checks on all personnel currently working with dangerous pathogens, toxins 
or genetic material 
62% 
Increased screening of all new personnel with future access to dangerous pathogens, etc.  62% 
Requiring procedures to authorise and control off-site transfers of dangerous pathogens, etc.  56% 
Increased requirements for material control in institutions  53% 
Scrutiny by funding bodies considering R&D proposals  47% 
Scrutiny by scientific journals when papers are submitted  47% 
More rigorous (safety) risk assessment of proposed work  41% 
More rigorous ethical review of proposed work  41% 
Codes of conduct  32% 
Denying access to nationals from countries of concern to dangerous pathogens, etc.  21% 
These results indicate that the sample are willing to consider a wide range of possible policy options, but 
prefer options that do not unduly hinder research or teaching.  
Further investigation of the reasons for lack of support for more rigorous safety or ethical assessment found a 
widespread belief that current levels of risk assessment and ethical review were adequate and that further 
rigour would impede research. It was also discovered that the limited support for the last two options was due 
to a lack of understanding of their underlying logic. For example, the sample failed to see how implementing 
a code of conduct would strengthen biosecurity or help to ensure an effective biosecurity norm across the UK 
science base.  
In the case of the last option, only 21% of the sample believed that denying access to nationals from 
countries of concern was an option worth considering. This result seems to conflict with the high scoring 
options of increased security checks on all personnel with current or future access to dangerous pathogens. 
This suggests the presence of other factors in the samples’ decision-making processes. The project found 
that one such factor is the support for the cultural norm of universality of participation in research irrespective 
of an individual’s nationality.  
Page 6  
Who ought to have responsibility for protecting against misuse?  
When asked who ought to be responsible for protecting against the possible misuse of the life sciences, our 
sample favoured self-governance by the institutions themselves (76%) and the scientific community at large 
(71%). There was also a preference for funding bodies to take responsibility for assessing risk before 
research takes place rather than for scientific journals to address the risks after the research is completed (a 
59% to 29% preference). Reasons given for the high preference toward some form of self-governance were 
based on a response to frustration caused by “overly complex and bureaucratic regulations”.  
However, the sample generally recognised that some form of government participation was necessary. Fifty-
eight per cent of the sample believed that of the options they would consider to strengthen the biosecurity 
norm, the best practice for implementation would be through formal regulation by government only after 
consultation with members of the scientific community. Participants explained the need for formal regulation 
as ensuring “consistency”, “uniformly high standards of design and implementation” and application “across 
the board”. Mention was also given to the need for “outside auditing and regulation with sanctions that pose a 
real threat to those that do not comply” indicating some scepticism about self-regulation.  
Of the options given, a marked preference was given for a focal role in the development and implementation 
of formal regulations to be given to government departments with which the sample have pre-existing 
relationships, such as the Health and Safety Executive (68%) or the Department of Trade and Industry 
(32%). Of those government departments primarily involved with non-health and safety issues, 47% of the 
sample preferred the involvement of the Home Office or the Security Services.  
Analysis  
When interpreting the results from this report it is important to recognise that this was only a pilot project. 
Care must therefore be taken in drawing conclusions or policy implications, as results are indicative rather 
than conclusive. However, having noted these caveats this subset of the project results does suggest that the 
implementation of new biosecurity controls in the UK has been conducted very successfully. The project 
found that 79% of our sample regarded the current balance in the UK between scientific freedom and 
security as satisfactory.  
It is, of course, possible that the research was undertaken too early. New legislation or improperly handled 
implementation has the potential to generate substantial future costs. However, the lack of substantial 
disruption is an important finding as it suggests that science and security do not necessarily have to be in 
conflict with one another.   
As already noted, the research suggests three factors that have contributed to the successful implementation 
(thus far) of UK biosecurity controls:  
1.  Pre-existing biosafety measures which ensured a degree of biosecurity; 
2.  A responsive approach to regulation by the implementing body; and 
3.  A flexible and socially responsible reaction to the new controls by the UK scientific community.  
Factors influencing successful implementation 1: biosafety and 
biosecurity 
One of the main contributing factors for the successful implementation thus far of the obligations in the Anti 
Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001 has been the high level of pre-existing biosafety procedures that can 
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also function as biosecurity measures. The links between biosafety and biosecurity have been a recurring 
theme in this project.  
Scientific activity in the UK has been heavily regulated since the 1970s through successive health and safety 
measures. The Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 for example:  
[I]ntroduced a broad goal setting, non-prescriptive model, based on the view that 
‘those that create risk are best placed to manage it’. In place of existing detailed and 
prescriptive industry regulations, it created a flexible system whereby regulations 
express goals and principles, and are supported by codes of practice and guidance. 
Based on consultation and engagement, the new regime was designed to deliver a 
proportionate, targeted and risk-based approach.11  
That ‘flexible system’ has since created procedures to deal with the acquisition of dangerous material, access 
to laboratories and data by visitors and short-term workers, and the transfer of dangerous materials.  
Although biosafety and biosecurity are fundamentally different – biosafety being concerned with protecting 
the health and safety of workers and the environment whilst the central concern of biosecurity is 
unauthorised acquisition – the norms are compatible and it can be argued that the implementation of UK 
biosecurity measures has drawn heavily on the biosafety model. The new biosecurity legislation, for instance, 
has concentrated on tightening existing practices rather than introducing radically new requirements. Indeed 
some of the procedural changes introduced into UK laboratories since 2001, such as more rigorous risk 
assessment procedures, increased material safety requirements, and improved recording and regulation of 
the possession and transfer of dangerous materials, may have occurred as a result of the periodic reviews of 
biosafety that have become the practice in UK workplaces, rather than specifically in response to biosecurity 
legislation and government inspections.  
This suggests that partial determination of the variation in national and international implementing costs of 
biosecurity policies (e.g. disruption to research, additional spending) might be explained by the extent of pre-
existing national biosafety regulations. Furthermore, this suggests that the costs of implementation might be 
substantially higher in institutions with lower levels of health and safety procedures. Given that the sample 
was biased towards scientists working with dangerous human pathogens, extending the implementation 
process beyond Schedule 5 of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001 may generate more 
substantial costs.  
Factors influencing successful implementation 2: the implementation 
process 
Effective implementation of any biosecurity control on dual use technologies is challenging because it has the 
potential to impose substantial costs upon legitimate actors. Further, effective implementation requires the 
co-operation of the scientific community, many of whom will not have had previous contact with the security 
community. Given the cultural differences between the ‘open’ scientific community and the ‘closed’ security 
community, care is needed to avoid a clash of cultures. 12 
Given these difficulties, the second factor which has influenced successful implementation has been the 
actions of the implementing body – the National Counter Terrorism Security Office.13 This body has come 
                                            
11 Health and Safety Executive Thirty Years on and Looking Forward: The Development and Future of the Health and Safety 
System in Great Britain, 2004. 
12 Atlas R, “National security and the biological research community”, Science, vol 298, no 5594, 2002. 
13 The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) is a specialist police organisation co-located with the Security Service 
in the National Security Advice Centre. For more information see http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page163.html#police   
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close to producing a textbook example of successful change management. The implementation of new 
regulations has exploited pre-existing links and channels of communication between the biosafety and 
scientific communities and used them as avenues into the scientific research community. The implementation 
process has thus far been non-confrontational and, because of the role given to biosafety officials, has to 
some extent been responsive to the organisational culture and work practices of the scientific community.  
However, only 21% of the sample believed that the police ought to have responsibility for protecting against 
the misuse of the life sciences. Given the bias in the sample, this result suggests that practising scientists 
favour the use of other mechanisms to protect the life sciences against misuse. One participant explained 
that there were good interactions between officials and university biosafety staff “but a great deal needs to be 
done to get leaders of research projects involved. They will be at the front line when implementation is 
required”. It is possible therefore that the current low level of support may increase once direct 
communication occurs between the police and practising scientists.  
Factors influencing successful implementation 3: the response of the 
scientific community 
The third factor influencing successful implementation has been the proactive response of the sample. 
The scientists interviewed repeatedly expressed a recognition that scientific research does not exist within a 
moral or social vacuum and that they, as scientists, have to be responsive to changes in society. As a result, 
they were inclined to take a flexible and proactive approach to risk management. Even in situations where 
the sample thought that the risk assessments were unrealistic, they recognised the need to be responsive to 
public concerns and to take into consideration not just risks, but also the public’s concerns and perceptions 
about those risks.  
Although general awareness within the sample about current issues related to preventing legitimate science 
and technology being misused was quite low, there was a much higher level of awareness about how a 
scientist engaged on legitimate work might unknowingly contribute to the development of biological weapons 
or to bioterrorism. For example, participants believed that a scientist could unknowingly contribute by 
manipulating an organism to “overcome natural and therapeutic controls”, by “inappropriate release of 
information”, or “by making loans or gifts of equipment”. Many in the sample believed that their awareness of 
the issues could improve if there was an opportunity for increased interaction with the government officials 
who design biosecurity policies.  
The respondents also regularly reflected on the unintended consequences of different policies because of 
what the sample regarded as a lack of appreciation of the subtleties of scientific research. For example, 
policies based on the constraint of dissemination of information at the publication stage were considered 
inappropriate because the research methodology and findings would already have been publicised at 
conferences. Similarly, controls restricting the number of foreign nationals with access to dangerous 
pathogens were considered problematic in an environment where universities are actively encouraged to 
increase their foreign student numbers.  
Many in the sample repeatedly expressed their desire to be better guardians of their science and wished to 
be more actively involved in the process of developing effective UK biosecurity policies by offering their 
scientific expertise and cultural knowledge. These participants felt they could be better guardians if they had 
better understanding of the types and risks of misuse, and of the logic underpinning regulatory measures 
such as control lists and export licences.  
Their desire to have more active engagement with biosecurity officials is unlikely to be a result of any 
perceived direct benefit, as only 15% of the sample had received any. Their desire is more likely to stem from 
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revulsion at the possibility of their legitimate research being misused and concerns about the impact of 
inappropriate regulations. 
Risk management and the scientific community  
Although this pilot project only explored a very specific part of security policy with a very small sample of 
scientists, it does suggest that there has been a major change in how the scientific community conceives of 
risk and attempts to manage it. On several occasions our interviewees stated that the BSE disaster had 
fundamentally changed the way that British society was prepared to accept risk assessments from scientists. 
Similarly, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology report on Science and Society14 
drew attention to how the British public was increasingly unwilling to accept scientific statements in an 
unquestioning manner. Partly in response to these changes, interviewees noted that the social legitimacy of 
scientific knowledge is increasingly dependent on scientists engaging with wider society, suggesting that the 
proposals of the Royal Society report on the management of scientific risk have been adopted.15 
Clearly the project was drawing on a self-selecting sample of interviewees who, by agreeing to be 
interviewed, were already more likely to be inclined to engage outside their disciplines. However, the 
consistency of their responses suggests that there is at least a subpopulation of the scientific community that 
not only recognises the risks of misuse of scientific knowledge, but also recognises the importance of public 
perceptions of that risk, and their role in responding to those perceptions. This reflexive nature can be seen 
by the fact that while 47% would consider editorial scrutiny of papers at publication, only 39% believed the 
process would reduce the risks of misuse. This indicates that at least some thought that such policies should 
be considered either because they might be effective for unintended reasons, or because they considered 
them effective ways of dealing with other concerns and perceptions. 
Interviews suggested that the scientific community was prepared to expend considerable effort engaging with 
the wider community to generate and maintain what Gibbons and colleagues call ‘socially robust 
knowledge’.16 In the context of biological weapons non-proliferation this involved recognising the uncertainties 
surrounding risk assessments and a focus on processes that manage and reduce unknown and possibly 
unknowable risks. This focus on improving risk management processes is reflected in the support for the 
Health and Safety Executive as the preferred medium through which government should enact regulations. 
The Health and Safety Executive has a long established working relationship with the scientific community 
and focuses on allowing scientists to exploit their expert knowledge of local situations to create more effective 
policy. While the academic social science literature has called for the scientific community to be more 
reflexive in its approach to risk management, our results, though only tentative, suggest that at the micro-level 
this has already happened. The policy issue is therefore not about changing scientists’ understanding of risk, 
but of providing them with the time and resources they need to effectively engage with the policy making 
process.  
Final reflections  
The results from this pilot project seem to indicate that thus far, the implementation of UK biosecurity controls 
has been carried out with limited negative impact on the scientific community. It thus appears that post 9/11 
changes in attitudes and procedures within the scientific community working with controlled pathogens have 
been less disruptive in the UK than in the US and German scientific communities.  
                                            
14 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Science and Society, HMSO, March 2002. 
15 Royal Society Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, Second edition, London: UK, The Royal Society, 1992. 
16 Gibbons M, C Limoges, H Nowotny, S Schwartman, P Scott  and P Trow, The New Production of Knowledge, London Sage, 
1994. 
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As already mentioned, it is possible that this research was undertaken too early, and that future legislation or 
improperly handled implementation has the potential to generate substantial costs to UK science. As such it 
will be necessary to regularly review the impact of dual use controls on UK science. This project has 
developed and validated a methodology to identify relevant members of the scientific community and obtain 
such information.  
One participant highlighted the need for a two-stage implementation process of national biosecurity 
measures – the first stage involving securing adherence with minimal costs, the second stage involving a 
long-term culture change in the scientific community. With the first stage being conducted successfully, 
implementers can now turn their attention to the longer-term objective of a cultural change within the 
scientific community. This project has shown that this may require a change to the type of engagement 
currently conducted between the scientific and security communities, to take into consideration the norms 
and practices of the scientific community. An appreciation of these norms will reduce potential resistance to 
new or extended biosecurity legislation and may encourage full and effective participation by the scientific 
community in UK efforts to reduce the threat from biological weapons.  
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